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Abstract 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 ushered in a financial crisis whose ramifications are 
still being felt. Within the EU, collapse not only led to a change in regulatory rhetoric, 
emphasising  the need to secure the stability of EU money markets, but also to a significant 
widening and deepening of technocratic supervisory structures for European financial 
services. This paper accordingly investigates the newly established European System for 
Financial Supervision and, in particular, semi-autonomous EU agencies for banking, 
insurance and securities, for its ability to provide robust regulation and supervision within 
Europe. However, it analyses this increase in technocratic governance at supranational level 
in light of the worrying question of whether it has undermined capacity for political action 
within Europe. At a time when readily-apparent failings in established technocratic 
governance in Europe (monetary union) have led only to more technocratisation (proposed 
fiscal union), perhaps to the point of systemic collapse, the general European trend to expert-
led and evidence-based supervision must be doubted; not simply because it has failed on its 
own terms, but also because it has established a technology of expertise, or dominant 
rationality, which further encourages abdication of political responsibility for economic crisis. 
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A Technology of Expertise: 
EU Financial Services Agencies 
 
I. A technocratic trend in crisis  
Financial and sovereign debt crises have ushered in an unprecedented era of 
technocracy and technocratic governance within the European Union. The 
most striking examples have been those of the establishment of technocratic 
or quasi-technocratic ‘governments’ in Italy and Greece. Vitally, however, a 
European trend away from democratic government structures is not merely a 
crisis-driven phenomenon. Instead, it is also a far deeper historical 
progression, which gives rise to fundamental questions about the governing 
relationships now being established within Europe between legitimate 
democratic process, effective exercise of political and administrative power, 
the deployment of technical expertise and the (autonomous) operation of 
market forces.1 The unanticipated establishment in late 2010 of a European 
System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) was an immediate EU response to 
financial meltdown, and was greeted as such by the European Parliament, 
which continues to be generally hostile to the extension of technocratic 
governance within Europe. At the same time, however, the creation of the 
ESFS, comprising three European Supervisory Authorities for financial 
services (ESAs), as well as the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and 
national regulators, is also only one further chapter in on-going EU efforts to 
                                                        
1 Debates positing a ‘technocratic’ character for European integration versus the political union 
of Europe are as old as the European Economic Communities. For theories of the ‘European 
regulatory state’, ‘functionally-differentiated European integration’ and the ‘European Economic 
Constitution’: Joerges (2004).  
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balance functional demands for effective technocratic governance of intricate 
European integration processes (output legitimation) against the democratic 
imperatives of European Union (input legitimation). 
The need to balance output against input legitimation is not peculiar to the 
EU; neither is it a new need. From its inception, the modern nation state has 
faced a critical conundrum: modernity’s state owes its core legitimacy to its 
ability to govern well but the act of ‘good’ governing is made up of two 
contradictory components. On the one hand, the term ‘government’ 
simultaneously captures the Enlightenment concept of popular sovereignty 
and entails establishment of the democratic process, which ensures that 
government for the people is also government by the people. On the other, 
good governing also requires that government is effective, that it may draw 
on the functional resources that can ensure that the will of the people is done 
and that democratic mandates can in fact be imposed on a social environment 
beyond political discourse. Democratic government can never be separated 
from its own functional or ‘non-majoritarian’ administration; nor, however, 
can it ever be divorced from the abiding fear that creation of executive power 
in order to implement political goals might itself undermine democratic 
process. The traditional spectre is that of the usurping administration; an 
unchecked executive which, if given too great a margin of discretion, might 
create policy of its own and wield power against the will and to the detriment 
of the people. By the same token, however, the conventional response to this 
danger – or ‘transmission-belt model’ of administration – is by now so well 
entrenched within modern states as to be a constitutional truism: a hierarchy 
of norms (higher legislative and lower administrative) must be established, a 
ban on delegation of discretionary powers must be imposed and the rule of 
law must be widened, in order to encompass judicial policing of narrowly-
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drawn democratic mandates through the proscribing of discretionary exercise 
of powers by the administration (Stewart 1975; Everson 1995).   
The Lisbon Treaty has now reproduced this constitutional truism within 
primary European Law. Article 290 TFEU establishes a hierarchical 
distinction between legislative and non-legislative acts, introduces a strict ban 
on the delegation of ‘essential’ legislative matters to the expanding 
administrative arm of the European Commission and subjects all delegations 
of powers to the Commission to on-going ‘democratic’ supervision by the 
Council and Parliament by means of a primary legal norm of recall of powers. 
Nonetheless, this European re-statement of the transmission-belt model 
cannot obscure an obvious fact that the EU has suffered the conventional 
tensions between input and output legitimacy in an altered and heightened 
form. The EU is not now and never has been a conventionally modern polity. 
Instead, in-built tensions in the structures of the Union between the joint 
pursuit of the supranational integration interest and the residual national 
competences of its severally sovereign member states have not only created a 
striking democratic deficit, but have also given rise to a series of conceptual 
and institutional lacunae within the governing structures of the Union. These 
gaps have famously been filled, not with government, but rather with 
vehicles and concepts of ‘governance’, which are in no small part legitimated 
with reference to functionalist effectiveness (Dehousse 2001); and nowhere is 
this trend more apparent than in the core business of the EU, that of the 
‘liberalising’ convergence of national economies. The demand for economic 
and scientific expertise to oversee technical regulatory convergence in the 
internal market has far outstripped the administrative capacities of the 
Commission, and has consequently witnessed the growth of a vast ad hoc 
European administration – problematically established outside the 
institutional structures of the treaties – of committees (comitology) and semi-
A Technology of Expertise 
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autonomous agencies, which also network horizontally with national 
administrations. 
The predominance of a narrative of governance within EU institutional 
dialogue is also noteworthy on its own terms as a justificatory discourse that 
privileges mechanisms of expertise, transparency and deliberation above 
traditional models of democratic legitimacy, such as aggregative 
representation and political accountability.2 Similarly, when viewed together 
with the vast number of quasi-technocratic bodies producing binding norms 
at EU level,3 the conceptually-flavoured European governance debate would 
seem to support commentators who have maintained that the entire European 
construct must be viewed as a technocratic enterprise, as a ‘regulatory state’ 
or as a ‘fourth branch of government’ (Majone 1996), with its own specific, 
non-majoritarian legitimacy. The degree of EU reliance on technocratic 
governance is accordingly revealed and explained: the integration of expertise 
within EU institutional structures is not only novel and pragmatic answer to 
the functional imperatives of European (market) integration, but is also a 
response to normative necessity or to the imperative to identify legitimation 
for an on-going integration project outside the settled contours of government, 
and beyond traditional government’s strict division between legislative will 
and executive action. 
In this setting, the emergence of European transmission in Article 290 TFEU is 
incongruous, but is also representative of continuing mistrust within the EU 
institutional structure of its own efforts to overcome the legislative-executive 
divide in a convincing manner. The spectre of unchecked technocratic 
governance remains an object of suspicion, and must surely continue to be so, 
                                                        
2 See, only, European Commission, White Paper on Governance COM(2001) 428 final 
3 Falke (1996) details the extent of comitology: approximately 50,000 decisions were taken by 
agricultural and regulatory committees between 1971 and 1995. Committee activity has no 
abated: 270 committees delivered 2185 opinions in 2008 
(http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regcomitology/docs/com-2009-0335_en.pdf.) 
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especially at a time of economic crisis when a particularly striking corollary to 
the unexpected extension of technocratic governance is loss of political 
capacity, or the inability of democratic process to impose its sovereign will on 
financial turmoil. Continuing suspicion and diminished political steering 
consequently leads this analysis to approach the creation of the ESFS in a 
broader manner. Above all, the spotlight is focused on a complementary 
trend to European technocratisation, which has its roots firmly within the 
member states rather than Union institutions: the permissive consensus, 
which has, since the early 1980s, lost confidence in the steering capacities of 
the welfare and social state, and has placed its faith in the wealth-creating 
powers of market operation instead (Crouch 2011; Everson & Joerges 2012). 
In this analysis, traditional transmission administration is placed under strain, 
not simply because the political constructs of democratic process underlying 
notions of ‘good’ governing are themselves mutating as governments – 
currently in response to globalisation processes – re-invent or seek to expand 
their now limited functional capacities within supranational institutions 
which are necessarily divorced from traditional government models. Instead, 
liberalising processes of European market integration, as well as increased 
reliance upon regulatory technocratic expertise, are facilitated as the 
commanding constitutional relationship between polity and market is 
fundamentally altered such that a protected private sphere of market 
operation, which was once limited to the safeguarding of individual 
(contractual) rights, is radically expanded in order to create a realm in which 
the ‘rationalities’4 of market operation must and will be shielded from 
majoritarian political influence. The potential consequences of this consensus 
for discussion of the expert-led trend away from government through 
democratic process cannot be overstated. Heightened reliance on technocratic 
                                                        
4 The term is taken from Michel Foucault, from his assertion that the evolution of ‘savoir-faire’, or 
technical knowledge, has fundamentally altered modes of human governing (Foucault 2008). 
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expertise has a qualitative, as well as quantitative character. To the degree 
that permissive consensus continues to dominate its institutional and political 
environment, technocratisation also encompasses radical self-limitation of the 
sovereign polity that historically mandated all exercise of executive power. 
Technocratisation, or ‘scientification’ entails the wholesale transference of 
steering capacities to rationalities that evolve within the ‘independent’ 
market, as well as a normative commitment to establish and protect an 
autonomous sphere of ‘the market’ within which such rationalities might 
continue to unfold themselves free from all political interference.  
The most startling and technocratically-obdurate EU institution of expertise 
formed in the wake of a diffuse notion that market rationalities should be 
afforded an autonomous realm of self-expression is the European Central 
Bank (ECB). However, the following analysis investigates the manifestation of 
scientification at a lower level of European governance; that of the three ESAs 
established within the ESFS – the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), and the European Insurance 
and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). In so doing, however, the 
focus of attention is similarly placed on a vital element that has been 
overlooked within traditional EU governance debate: to what degree has the 
trend to technocratic expertise also augmented a general crisis of political 
capacity? Has it nurtured a dominantly unavoidable rationality – or, in the 
terms of Foucault, ‘technology’ of expertise (Foucault 2008) – which similarly 
usurps democratic process and sovereign will, not simply because the 
executive seeks dominance, but because the polity itself has abdicated all 
sociological responsibility for the exercise of executive power? 
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II. Governance versus government in financial services 
supervision 
The ESFS was established by a series of EU regulations in 2010.5 In full, it 
comprises:  
(1) The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), which is chaired by the 
President of the ECB and includes governors of national central banks 
(NCBs), a Commission representative and the Chairs of the three ESAs, 
and which is served by an Advisory Scientific and a Technical Committee. 
The role of the ESRB is to provide ‘macro-prudential’ supervision, or to 
identify and combat ‘systemic risks’, or hazardous financial activities, 
which threaten the functioning of the ESFS as a whole. 
(2) The three ESAs who administer a complex series of common financial 
regulations by means of the establishment of the Binding Technical 
Standards (BTS) and jointly-established practices which inform micro-
prudential supervision of individual financial institutions at national level. 
ESAs are also charged with identification of systemic risks within the 
system and their notification to the ESRB. A Joint Committee of the ESAs 
co-ordinates micro-supervision across the three sectors and strengthens 
macro-supervisory information flows. 
(3) National Supervisory Authorities (NSAs), which are formally responsible 
for micro-prudential supervision at member state level. 
(4) A single Board of Appeal responsible for individual challenges to agency 
decisions. 
                                                        
5 Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 (ESRB Regulation); Regulation No 1096/2010 (ECB 
Regulation); Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (ESMA); Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (EBA); 
Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 (EIOPA). 
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The ESFS is not the first endeavour to co-ordinate supervisory standards and 
practices at supranational level. Instead, it builds upon the series of 
regulatory principles (European Financial Services Action Plan), national 
regulatory networks, as well as European co-ordinating and standard-setting 
committees for the financial services, established in the wake of the report of 
the ‘Lamfalussy Committee’ of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets in early 2001.6 However, lying between the Commission’s 
establishment of its own comitology system and a far broader Union 
commitment – sanctioned by Council and Parliament – to the ESFS, we find 
the collapse of Lehman Brothers in late 2008, a significant change in the 
rhetorical justification for institutional reform at EU level, a host of new 
financial regulations, and a significant widening and deepening of 
supranational regulatory structures founded in independent expertise. 
The Lamfalussy group were primarily concerned with the establishment of an 
integrated and globally competitive European market for financial services. 
At this stage, unwieldy EU regulations and discrepancies in their national 
implementation were seen as regulatory failings, not because they 
accentuated obscurity within financial markets, but rather since they led to 
differential treatment of financial instruments, thus ‘violating the pre-
requisite of the neutrality of financial supervision’ in the EU market and 
retarding adaption of European financial services ‘to the pace of global 
financial market change.’7 By rhetorical contrast, the ‘high-level’ de Larosière 
group on EU financial supervision – convened by the Commission in 
response to financial melt-down – appeared to have returned to a more 
traditional concept of market failure, concluding that the system of European 
                                                        
6 See, in particular, Commission Decisions, 2001/527/EC and 2001/528/EC (EU Securities 
Committee and Committee of European Securities Regulators); Commission Decision 
2004/10/EC (Committee of European Banking Supervisors; Commission Decision 2004/9/EC 
(Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors).  
7 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-
men_en.pdf 
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financial regulation must be strengthened and expanded: first, to improve an 
‘inadequate mix’ of regulatory and supervisory skills, which had not only 
seen too little information gathered and shared ‘on the global magnitude of 
global leveraging’, but which had also witnessed a catastrophic failure to 
‘fully understand or evaluate the size of the risks’; and secondly, to create a 
co-ordinated early-warning system to identify macro-systemic risks of a 
contagion of correlated horizontal shocks.’8 
In addition to the imposition of enhanced minimum capital and solvency 
requirements on financial institutions, the regulatory and supervisory 
structure was significantly enhanced with the establishment of the ESFS and 
the creation of new, semi-autonomous authorities – or EU agencies – for the 
regulation and supervision of securities, banking and insurance. This final 
development is particularly striking. In the face of crisis, the European 
Parliament dropped its long standing opposition to the further consolidation 
of EU governance by means of supranational ‘agencification’. Despite having 
contributed to a factual moratorium on the establishment of any further such 
EU bodies through its lukewarm reception to the Commission’s draft Inter-
Institutional Agreement (IIA) on the common operating framework for 
European regulatory agencies, 9 Parliament enthusiastically welcomed the 
ESFS and the three ESAs (Moloney 2011a).  
 
1. Autonomy and accountability in the EU agency model 
The current Commission preference for European governance by means of 
European agencies or semi-autonomous expert bodies – most forcefully stated 
                                                        
8 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/de_larosiere_report_en.pdf 
9 COM(2005)59 final. A factual moratorium was established as the Commission was required to 
undertake a further review of the operations of such bodies already operating at EU level, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘European 
Agencies – the Way Forward’, COM(2008) 159 final. 
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in its 2001 White Paper on European Governance – in large part derives from 
the failings in its own comitology structures exposed by the BSE crisis. BSE 
still functions as a potent warning to proponents of technocratic governance, 
especially with regard to the problem of what to do when technical expertise 
can no longer provide technical answers and of how to respond when diffuse 
hazard cannot be concretised as risk ‘because the science has run out’ (see 
below). In the 1990s, however, the failure of scientific and administrative 
expertise at national and supranational level – both of quantification of the 
risks of human evolution of variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and of adequate 
post-market control of the spread of ‘mad cow’ products – was primarily 
viewed within an institutional paradigm that stressed the subsequent need to 
act in order to improve and to ensure the quality and delivery of scientific and 
technical expertise. Above all, lack of transparency within the various ad hoc 
scientific committees established by the Commission to assess risks both 
exacerbated a lack of scientific independence at EU level10 and foreclosed 
potential for independent epistemic review of scientific findings. In addition 
to highlighting the functional ‘obscurantism’ of the comitology model 
(Dehousse 2003), the BSE saga also revealed the need for permanently funded 
EU scientific expertise in order to facilitate long-term research upon the basis 
of which hazards could be transformed into quantifiable and therefore 
‘manageable’ risks, as well as a demand for permanent oversight of 
implementation of EU standards at member state level (Vos 2000). 
Transparency and permanence are the hallmarks of the operations of 
expertise within regulatory agencies (Demortain 2010). As a consequence, a 
radical expansion in the use of this vehicle followed the BSE scandal. The 
European Food Standards Agency (EFSA) established within its wake, is now 
one of the most powerful institutions operating within the EU institutional 
                                                        
10 Most ‘European’ experts involved were connected with the UK Government (Vos 2000). 
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architecture (Everson & Vos 2008). Article 290 TFEU’s restriction of delegated 
powers undoubtedly stands as testament to continuing parliamentary 
reservations towards the executive spectre within Europe.11 However and 
particularly so following miscarriage of the idealistic quest to create a self-
consciously political European moment within the failed Constitutional 
Treaty, governance continues to compensate for lacking government within 
Europe and, in the case of the EU agency model, forcefully asserts its own 
normative as well as pragmatic claim to legitimacy. 
The existence of autonomous regulatory agencies, which operate at arms’ 
length from conventional government has long been justified by the argument 
that areas requiring complex technical oversight are best governed by 
‘experts’ (Vibert 2007). However, it has recently been further facilitated by 
alterations in the manner in which the relationship between exercise of 
political power and market operation is viewed. More particularly, the 
argument traditionally used in order to justify the operation of independent 
central banks – one that a polity should guard against the danger that its own 
government will manipulate exchange rates for short-term political gain 
(Majone 1996; Vibert 2007) – finds a far more general application within the 
permissive consensus that market operation should as far as is possible take 
place within its own autonomous sphere. ‘Efficiency’ is the leading criterion 
within a modern regulatory paradigm that seeks to refashion regulation in 
order to separate out the pursuit of general re-distributive goals from sectoral 
regulatory aims. Assuming a higher normative commitment to autonomous 
market operation, efficiency based regulatory models argue that the statist 
tendency to a political economy of ‘corporatism’ – distorting conflation of 
micro-economic market regulation with redistributive macro-economic 
                                                        
11 Never a comitology fan or concerned that its competences might be surreptitiously siphoned 
off to the Commission in the fog of committee proceedings (Bradley St Claire 1997), Parliament is 
similarly wary that its competences may be ceded to powerful agency heads (Geradin & Petit 
2004).  
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policies – can be combatted by means of establishment of governing 
regulatory expertise within bodies that act independently from government. 
Vitally, however, efficiency-based regulatory models also gain in normative 
legitimacy as postulation of a concept of pareto-efficiency itself mediates 
against concerns that executive power should never be endowed with too 
broad a mandate. In other words, discretionary powers may be delegated to 
independent agencies where they have no redistributive consequences – 
which will always require majoritarian political oversight – and the subject-
matter of regulation is value-neutral in terms of welfare losses within the 
general populace (Majone 1994). Accordingly, and to the degree that pursuit 
of economic efficiency has become a self-limiting principle within the polity, 
the independence of regulatory agencies is transformed from constitutional 
spectre to positive constitutional good; one which must be positively 
protected from potential perversion within political process. 
In this analysis, an ‘independent fourth branch of government’ is no stranger 
to the transmission-belt model of administration, but is instead wholly 
integral to it being no more than its most modern manifestation. The long-
term will of the polity for efficient regulation is ensured rather than 
endangered by the shielding of regulatory expertise from political 
contingency. At the same time, however, the modernised transmission 
construct demands that an independent administration of expertise must also 
be subject to control, in order to ensure that it is capable of fulfilling its 
regulatory functions and performs them well. The agency must consequently 
be made accountable to traditional institutions, as well as to the general 
public, in a manner that does not endanger its own autonomy, and is so 
through a plural scheme of oversight – drawn from US experience – which 
ensures that ‘no-one controls the agency, yet the agency is under control’ 
(Moe 1990; Everson 1995).  
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The European mode of ensuring the independence and accountability of EU 
agency operation primarily owes to the continuing impact of the ‘Meroni 
doctrine’, or establishment by the CJEU of a principle of ‘balance of powers’ 
within the Union together with a concomitant ban placed on the delegation of 
powers to ad hoc institutions not named within EU Treaties.12 Despite the fact 
that the fait accompli of European agency operation has belatedly been 
recognised within the Lisbon Treaty,13 the Meroni doctrine continues to 
preclude the full independence of agencies at EU level. Accordingly, EU 
agencies are only ever ‘semi-autonomous’, independent in fact rather that 
law, operating under the umbrella of the European Commission, which 
retains a final decision-making power. The strict application of Meroni is often 
regarded as an outdated anomaly within EU governance structures: a barrier 
to pragmatic institutional evolution (Geradin & Petit 2004). However, the 
sensitivity that attaches to a principle of the balance of powers is explained by 
the on-going tension between supranational integration interests and national 
sovereignty. The unforeseen shift to supranational re-regulation of the 
internal market is also a de facto alienation of national competence. To the 
degree that the primary function of the balance of powers is one of 
maintaining the transparency of the ever shifting constellation of national-
supranational competence, it might accordingly at least ensure that this 
alienation is never a silent one, but subject to explicit instead treaty alteration 
(Jacqué 1990). 
Ever-present national-supranational tension, as well as more conventional 
fears about alienation of the supranational legislative competence, explains 
the extreme caution of recent Commission documents detailing and 
simultaneously justifying its own principles of agency EU operation. The 
                                                        
12 Case (9/56) Meroni v High Authority [1957-58] ECR 133. 
13 But only to the degree that Article 263 TFEU expressly establishes a right of review of the CJEU 
over acts of agencies. 
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Commission’s relations with its own agencies are also often strained; after all, 
semi-autonomous agency operation also threatens to alienate the competences 
of a Commission, which will also be held accountable for its impacts (Everson 
& Vos 2008). Nevertheless, the agency vehicle provides the Commission with 
a vital increase in its functional capacities, making the Commission an 
institutionally powerful if sometimes reluctant proponent of an EU-specific 
model of agency operation. Distilling down the White Paper on Governance, 
the draft IIA and the ‘Way Forward for Agencies’, or Communication 
withdrawing the draft IIA,14 this justificatory model may be summarised as 
follows:      
(1) Agency creation and transmission: Although full independence cannot be 
accepted within EU structures, agencies are still legitimated with reference to 
the (economic) principle of utility. They will only be established where the 
‘added’ value of Community regulation can be demonstrated through cost-
benefit analysis. Similarly, the balance of powers plays its own rhetorically 
justificatory role: agencies have a particular role to play in areas where the 
(executive) powers of the member states must be pooled to avoid over-
concentration of powers at Union level; a notion which finds its counterpart 
in the establishment of ‘networked’ supranational-national agency operation. 
Likewise, transmission belt administration is assured by general restriction of 
the agency role to ‘preparatory’ decision-making in areas of ‘technical 
expertise’ where agencies can be supplied with ‘a clear executive mandate’. 
The executive limitation placed upon agencies – they will never be afforded 
‘genuine’ discretionary powers – is reinforced by 290 TFEU, determining that 
agencies may only be established by Parliament and Council regulations. 
(2) An agency structure of autonomy and accountability: Plural theories of agency 
control, find their application in the stipulation that agencies must be placed 
                                                        
14 See notes 2 and 9 above. 
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within ‘clear lines of accountability’. A degree of operational independence 
from the Commission is nonetheless established by virtue of their threefold 
division into a Director, administrative boards (executive boards) and 
scientific committees. The Director is typically appointed subject to 
parliamentary approval. Administrative boards are made up of representative 
of the Commission, Council and, where necessary, member states, as well as 
non-voting stakeholders. The members of the scientific committees of 
agencies are appointed in open public competition on the sole basis of their 
expertise. Independence is also assured by demands that member state 
agencies operative within the EU-national network, will be ‘autonomous’ of 
their own governments. 
(3) Ex ante and ex post accountability: The (modern) transmission principle of 
administration is further secured by imposition of a high degree of 
transparency upon agencies and the requirement that their proposed 
activities will always be laid down in an openly accessible annual work 
programme, which may likewise be subject to subsequent scrutiny in the light 
of the annual activity report. Agencies are also subject to a further scheme of 
ex post financial, political, administrative and judicial control, whereby 
significant oversight is furnished by the powers of the Court of Auditors, 
Council and European Parliament to approve agency budgets, and by review 
of individual decisions before the CJEU (Article 263 TFEU).  
(5) Scientific transparency and public accountability: The Commission also seeks 
to facilitate review of agency operation by broader epistemic communities. 
Transparent agencies will play a part in ‘the validation of the scientific-
technical basis for formal regulation’ and will be ‘held publicly accountable 
for this role’. Agencies also have an important function in relation to the 
integration of stakeholder views within public regulation, which occurs 
within the agency itself. Their role to ‘analyse and stimulate public debate at 
A Technology of Expertise 
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both European and international level’ attempts to reproduce the wider 
institutional legitimation, which arises as press and public follow the work of, 
for example, the policies of high-profile US agencies. 
 
2.  ESA Governance of European financial markets  
Up until financial crisis, the supranational regulatory interest in financial 
services sought only to create a ‘level competitive playing field’ between EU 
and US regulatory structures (Mülbert & Wilhelm 2010) and generally 
restricted itself to the legislative harmonisation of national prudential 
regulation: first, establishing the creditworthiness of individual financial 
institutions (1980s), thus allowing for the creation of ‘EU passports’, or ‘one-
seat authorisations’ for pan-European market actors (1990s); and secondly, 
engaging in co-operative national-supranational standard-setting and the 
sharing of best supervisory practices. Implementation of EU legislation was a 
matter for national authorities while material supervision, or regulation of the 
character of financial products, remained within the province of national 
supervisors. The period since crisis, however, has seen a deluge of financial 
services regulation.15 Major initiatives have primarily focused around 
implementation of the Basel III international regulatory framework for Banks 
and its de-leveraging, but (still) risk-based regulatory approach: in particular, 
a strengthening of each of its three pillars encompassing quantitative 
requirements (regulatory and economic solvency), qualitative requirements 
(risk management and supervisory oversight, including ‘stress tests’), as well 
as market discipline (disclosure and transparency). They have thus demanded 
a significant widening and deepening, both of EU legislation (Capital 
                                                        
15 See, for details as of late 2011, Mülbert & Wilhelm (2011). The deluge of regulation is often 
characterised as posing a danger of regulatory dissonance (Moloney 2010).    
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Requirement and Solvency Directives16), and vitally, of supranational 
standard-setting and supervisory oversight. Basel III convergence has also 
been augmented by proposed EU legislation on deposit guarantee schemes,17 
as well as by important regulatory interventions into credit and securities 
markets,18 which similarly increase potential expansion of the EU supervisory 
function (Moloney 2011b).  
The character of the EBA, the EIOPA and the ESMA as rule-making and 
supervisory authorities mark them out as some of the most powerful 
autonomous institutions ever established at EU level. Broadly similar to one 
another, the tasks of the agencies are laid down in Article 1 of each founding 
regulation. Charged with ‘improving the functioning of the internal market’, 
‘sound effective and consistent regulation and supervision’, ‘ensuring the 
integrity, efficiency and orderly functioning’ of markets, combatting 
‘regulatory arbitrage’, ‘consumer protection’ and strengthening of 
‘international supervisory co-ordination’, the agencies are afforded one major 
domain of rule-making powers:19 the power to make Binding Technical 
Standards (BTS). These comprise Technical Regulatory Standards for 
harmonisation of the provisions of EU regulation and Implementing 
Technical Standards to be applied at national level. Exercised under 
competences delegated to the Commission by Parliament and Council under 
Articles 290 and 291 TFEU, BTS are subject to a ‘regulatory with scrutiny 
procedure’ – reproducing the traditional procedures of the Comitology 
                                                        
16 Capital Requirements Directive (CRD III), 2010/76/EU (OJ L329/3 of 12.10.2010) for Banks, 
and the Solvency Directive for Insurers (Solvency II), 2009/138/EC (OJ L 335/1 of 17.12.2009). 
17 COM(2009)362 final for the banking sector.. 
18 Above all, the Securities Regulation on Credit Rating Agencies (Regulation (EC) No 
1060/2009), the Directive on Alternative Investment Funds (Directive 2011/61/EU, OJ L174/1, 
of 01.07.2011), as well as proposed regulation on over-the-counter derivatives and short-selling: 
COM(2010)484/5 and COM(2011)482. 
19 Article 10 and Article 15 founding Regulations. Similarly, the ESAs may contribute to the 
making of rules within the relevant ‘College of Supervisors’ (Moloney 2011a). Colleges of 
Supervisors exist at supranational and international level and are responsible for global 
standard-setting. 
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Decision20 – which determines that, if opposed to the proposed BTS, the 
Commission has the power only to delay its full adoption as a regulation or 
decision, subject to parliamentary and Council scrutiny. The supervisory 
functions of the agencies are wide-ranging, relating primarily to the co-
operative establishment of best practice or joint (risk-based) methodologies 
for national supervisory authorities through peer reviews and the issuing of 
recommendations and guidelines (Article 16 founding Regulations). 
Nevertheless, ‘soft’ supervision of national supervisory authorities hardens in 
particular situations, including: 
(1) Breach of Union Law (Article 17 founding Regulations ): when the 
relevant agency can make recommendations to national supervisors and 
private actors and pursue (Commission) enforcement proceedings; 
(2) Emergency Situations, or threats to systemic coherence (Article 18 
founding Regulations) where the relevant agency acts within the ESRB 
addressing decisions to competent national authorities and, where 
necessary, individual financial institutions; 
(3) Consumer protection: or action in the case of threats posed to the 
consumer by financial innovation (Article 9 founding Regulations), where 
the relevant agency may temporarily prohibit detrimental activities or 
products by means of powers conferred within the general regulatory 
framework of the EFSF, or under Article 18 emergency powers. 
Established in the midst of crisis, the first agencies to be subject to the new 
regime of non-delegation established by Article 290 TFEU, yet still established 
under an ad hoc regime of governance, the primary questions to be asked of 
the new ESAs are: are they functionally effective and to what degree can they 
                                                        
20 Decision 1999/468/EC, laying down the procedures for decision-making within Comitology. 
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claim their own degree of non-traditional legitimacy under the EU agency 
model?  
 
2.1. Utility and autonomy 
Predictably, the primary concerns that have to date been raised about ESA 
structures regard tensions inherent to their partially autonomous status 
(Moloney 2011a); or the danger that the efficiency of supranational oversight 
may be undermined by institutional tensions between agencies, Commission, 
Parliament and Council. The ESAs are established under the Meroni doctrine, 
such that final competence and accountability rests with the European 
Commission. As a consequence, and to the extent that each agency Chair is 
enjoined in the exercise of their powers ‘neither [to] seek or [to] take 
instruction from the Union institutions’ (Article 49 founding Regulations), 
potential arises for the self-same form of agency-Commission conflict that has 
historically marked the EU agency model. Where a major facet of each ESA’s 
functional legitimacy must be its capacity to respond speedily and 
appropriately to market conditions, the immediate danger is one that 
disruptive conflict will arise, in particular, during the negotiation of BTS 
between an expert-led agency seeking to concretise its profile and a 
Commission that is jealous of its own institutional competence. 
Commission-agency conflict is not new, however, and is one which has 
largely been negotiated without fundamental upheaval within EU 
institutional relations (Everson & Vos 2008). Nonetheless, an additional 
institutional strain arises as the post-Lisbon foundation of the ESAs dictates 
that their sphere of delegated powers is also subject to the transmission 
strictures of Article 290 TFEU. A ‘sunset clause’ applies, limiting the 
Commission’s competence to issue BTS within the EFSF for a period of four 
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years (Article 11 founding Regulations), at the end of which time a review 
must be conducted. Similarly, Parliament and Council may revoke this 
delegation at any time. Although sunset clauses have proved to be a powerful 
tool within the US, ensuring that independent agencies are wholly focused 
upon their executive mandates, their impact may prove to be counter-
productive within a specific EU constellation, which establishes semi-
autonomous institutions to exercise the mandated competences of a 
Commission that is held accountable for them, made vulnerable to Council or 
Parliament whim, and consequently may be prompted to intervene in internal 
ESA affairs. Further, where BTS are issued by agencies under the regulatory 
with scrutiny procedure, the breadth of potential inter-institutional conflict is 
significantly widened: on the one hand, placing regulatory efficiency in doubt 
as interventionist concerns may inform application of heightened ‘political’ 
influence; on the other, casting the Commission as perpetually rancorous 
looser in an institutional game of competence accrual. 
If the purpose of the ESFS is to promote the permissive consensus underlying 
autonomous, expert-led market regulation, the ‘semi-autonomous’ status of 
ESAs could prove to be the worst of all possible worlds. In addition, however, 
efficiency concerns have been raised about the expansion of ESA activities 
beyond their supranational regulatory role to one of supervision and 
implementation at national level.  On one level, these worries echo efficiency-
informed objections to the widening and deepening of the entire 
supranational regulatory competence. In this analysis, ‘integration by stealth’, 
or veiled neo-functionalist efforts to effect political integration by means of 
intensified EU market regulation, have not only frustrated efficiency-oriented 
regulatory programmes at national and European level, but have also 
undermined pareto-efficiency postulates as accentuated spill-over effects 
inexorably confront the Union with redistributive issues (Majone 2005). 
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However, given the co-ordination imperative that governs integration of the 
European financial services market, as well as the prevalence of regulatory 
arbitrage and contagion within the less intrusive Lamfalussy system, such 
arguments failed to convince in the run up to establishment of the ESFS 
(Snowdon & Lovegrove 2010), and are unlikely to convince now. At a less 
comprehensive level of critique, however, utility doubts may still be raised 
with regard to the balance struck within the ESAs between standard-setting 
and supervision, and between supranational and national input into the 
system. 
It is possible that ESAs will promote evolution within the ESFS of a sensitive 
network of national and supranational regulators, who through sharing of 
good practice, information and regulatory insights will improve the overall 
efficiency and stability of the EU regulatory system. Worries about future 
operation nonetheless coalesce around the question of whether the ESA-NRA 
relationship will be established in a ‘top-up’ or ‘bottom-down’ manner (Black 
2010). Potential conflict arises by virtue of the fact that regulatory standard-
setting cannot be easily divorced from supervisory implementation and 
oversight. Instead, the relationship between standards and their on-going 
application is a necessarily complex one, not simply because understandings 
about regulatory aims may differ at each level, but rather because their 
successful achievement is necessarily context dependent (Moloney 2011b). 
Several factors militate in favour of local flexibility in implementation of BTS. 
First, the ESAs are new, relatively inexperienced supervisors and are 
currently understaffed; a factor which gives rise to particular concern about 
their potential effectiveness with regard to (consumer) product regulation. 
Secondly, however, regulatory goals will also necessarily require adaptation 
in view of the varied institutional supervisory structures applying at national 
level. They may also become contentious as austerity bites and far-ranging 
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political decisions are made about allocation of resources at national 
administrative level. Above all, however, the risk-based approach to capital 
requirements and financial innovation proscribed by Basel III regulatory 
methodologies not only requires an intense degree of local knowledge in 
order to overcome informational asymmetries, but also demands regulatory-
implementing flexibility to allow for experimentation with regard to rapid 
financial innovation. Equally, experimentalist localism may act as a ‘safety-
valve’ within the system, easing contagion potential through a supervisory 
plurality that guards against the dangers that over-harmonisation and undue 
centralisation will themselves facilitate systemic shock (Black 2010; Moloney 
2011b).  
In other words, the system can only function effectively where the ESA-NRA 
relationship emerges as a genuinely-responsive and  ‘heterarchical’ network 
with effective national input into standard-setting and sensitive supranational 
oversight of implementation and supervision (Black 2010). Nonetheless, the 
hardened and direct intervention powers afforded ESAs do represent a new 
hierarchical element within EU oversight, raising potential for inefficient 
centralisation within day-to-day supervision, as well as the establishment of a 
‘too distant interlocutor’ in cases of potential systemic risk.     
       
2.2. A structure of accountable expertise 
An interesting peculiarity of ESA structure, which may militate against 
inefficiency effects, is the nature of expertise gathered within the authorities. 
Contrary to conventional EU agency practice, ESA structure does not 
reproduce the original regulatory/scientific committee divide born of 
comitology and generally transferred to EU agencies; nor has it experienced 
the unseemly scramble for parliamentary representation within the agency, 
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witnessed during other instances of agency establishment (Everson 2005). 
Instead, expertise headlines the agency in the character of the Board of 
Supervisors, which is made up of the heads of each NRA, and is responsible 
for issuing BST, decisions, recommendations and guidelines, as well as 
budgetary discipline. One Commission member, single members of each of 
the two other ESAs, as well as a representative of the ESRB also sit on the 
Board as ‘non-voting’ members (Article 40 founding Regulations). The self-
contained nature of technocratic expertise within the ESAs is further 
confirmed by the appointment of the Chairperson of the Authority for a 
period of 5 years by the Board of Supervisors itself, subject to a parliamentary 
approval process.21 A concept of ‘technocratic excellence’ also plays its role: 
the Chairperson of EIOPA, for example, is to be appointed ‘on the basis of 
merit, skills, knowledge of financial institutions and markets and of 
experience relevant to financial supervision and regulation’ (Article 48(2) 
EIOPA Regulation). Similarly, the Board of Supervisors appoints the 
Management Board, which is responsible for the day-to-day operations of 
each of the agencies and conduct of its multi-annual work-plans, as well as its 
Executive Director (on the basis of merit, subject to parliamentary approval).  
Possibly as a consequence of heightened influence afforded Parliament and 
Council under sunset clauses and revocation powers, the desire for political 
voice within the agencies is dampened. The contained technocratic nature of 
ESAs is likewise facilitated by a purging of national interest with regard to the 
establishment of duties of independence from the member states and Union 
institutions for both Supervisory and Executive boards (Articles 42 and 46 
founding Regulations). Political arbitrage is similarly militated against by 
                                                        
21 Parliament has already taken its approval power seriously, raising significant objections during 
the process of the appointment of the ESMA head. 
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simple majority voting in both Supervisory and Management Boards:22 the 
sole decisional criteria are technocratic in nature, shorn of political interest 
and thus – under theories of expert deliberation (Majone 1996) – facilitative of 
the objectivity and epistemic co-operation that might ensure ESFS efficiency. 
Given the technocratic coherence and functional autonomy of the ESAs, the 
primary legitimating mechanism for their operation is the establishment of an 
effective scheme of plural accountability, which ensures that the agency is 
both competent, and acts within its technical mandate. In this case, all the 
common control mechanisms apply: ex ante control of multi-annual work 
programmes and budgets by Parliament, Council, the Court of Auditors and 
by the Economic and Social Committee of the EU (Article 62 founding 
Regulations); on-going control of agency activities by means of parliamentary 
committee hearings, as well as inter-agency oversight within the joint 
committee of the ESA (Article 54 founding Regulations); and ex post multi-
institutional control both of budgets and annual reports. In addition, agency 
decisions addressed to individual actors may be reviewed by the CJEU 
(Article 61 founding Regulations). Concerns nevertheless do arise: first, with 
regard to the budgetary adequacy of the agencies (Moloney 2011b); and 
secondly, with regard to establishment of a two-stage process of appeals 
against individual agency decisions, whereby litigants will first be directed to 
the Joint Board of Appeals, whose members are appointed by Executive 
Boards, but act independently from them.23 Nevertheless, and in the absence 
of in-depth operating studies, it appears fair to state that – in structure at least 
– no-one controls the ESAs, yet the ESAs are under control. 
 
                                                        
22 In the absence of weighted voting, it will prove difficult to forge political alliances amongst 27 
voting members. 
23 Members can only be dismissed for ‘serious misconduct’, Article 58(5) founding Regulations. 
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2.3. Transparency and the public interest 
However, final doubts about the accountability of agencies within the EU 
must remain, particularly with regard to their transparency and public 
responsiveness. To a large extent, these worries have accompanied all EU 
agency operation from its outset (Everson 1995). However, the particular 
concern that EU agencies are unable to generate their own (critical) epistemic 
and public communities of review and social responsiveness is necessarily 
heightened in the case of ESAs.  
In contrast to the US (Shapiro 1988), EU institutional literature is strangely 
devoid of the theme of ‘agency capture’, which dominated the field in the 
1970s (Stiglitz 1989). Instead – in line with the efficiency-based consensus – 
industry actors are regarded as ‘stakeholders’ within the regulatory process, 
representatives of autonomous market process whose views must be taken 
seriously in the establishment of sensitive schemes of regulation and 
oversight. The same philosophy applies to ESAs who are mandated to 
establish ‘stakeholder’ groups (Article 37 founding Regulations) – comprising 
market actors, as well as consumers and academics – and to consult them 
prior to issuing BST. ESAs are also required to establish a measure of modern 
transparency by means of the maintenance of up-to-date websites, promoting 
wider industry-led and public debate about their activities (Article 1 founding 
Regulations). Market actors – including consumers – are no longer conceived 
of as ‘interests’ who seek to pervert oversight schemes to their own ends, but 
are rather viewed as ‘partners’ in the unfolding of autonomously rational and 
efficient market regulation.  
However, within the financial services sector, it was exactly this close 
relationship – between regulators and regulated – which contributed to 
financial collapse. Above all, the joint application of risk-based models of 
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economic solvency fostered particularly co-operative and intense relations 
between business, regulators and even an academic community, within which 
the fatal complacency arose, which tolerated and even welcomed 
unsustainable business models as wealth-creating vehicles of innovation, 
which were also of benefit to (disadvantaged) consumers. The potential for 
agency capture was instead replaced with the far more subtle, but no less 
catastrophic dangers posed by creation of a dominant ‘rationality’, a shared 
mode of thinking – or ‘cognitive failure’ (Black 2010) – which could not 
recognise, let alone tolerate dissent. Accordingly, in establishing its own 
epistemic community of review, the ESFS as a whole is surely charged with 
identifying voices, not of partnership, but of dissent – of ‘mavericks’ (Black 
2010) – of identifying challenges to its own philosophies and methodologies. 
Nonetheless, a vital question remains: where might these malcontents come 
from? 
Problems primarily arise with regard to fostering of wider public debate. 
Within the US, a vital element of legitimate agency operation is the broader 
public that attaches to particular and identifiable institutions, such as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (Vibert 2007). Nevertheless, in three 
decades of operation, no such ‘agency public’ has arisen within the EU. In 
part, the problem is one of a lack of a European press; the absence of a 
European public sphere of communication and the tendency to ‘renationalise’ 
European decision-making within a fragmented media which focuses on the 
implementation of EU decisions by national actors. The problem is also 
institutional: notwithstanding the fact that Supervisory Boards are enjoined to 
act ‘independently and objectively in the sole interests of the Union as a 
whole’ (Article 42 founding regulations), no general public right to challenge 
the actions of European Agencies has been established. The reformulated 
Article 263 TFEU has considerably widened the parties who might request 
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CJEU review of ESA implementing acts. Nonetheless, a European Procedures 
Act has yet to be established, lessening potential for procedurally-based 
actions before the Court. The publicity and ‘post-legislative’ control generated 
by class actions (Stewart 1975), is accordingly still absent from the EU system. 
Similarly, however, the problem is also specific to financial services. 
Confidentiality matters: in the case of emergency action to combat systemic 
risk, in particular, there are powerful reasons that militate against wide-scale 
provision of information to the public. 
 
III. The rationality of ‘risk and normality’  
1. Reinstated steering capacity in the responsive regulatory environment? 
To the degree that models of agency governance are predicated upon the 
efficiency of economic autonomy, within the postulate that pareto-efficient 
regulation is best conducted behind a firewall which guards against political 
contingency, the primary concerns in terms of legitimating institutional 
design must be those of the establishment of the independence and 
accountability of a shielded core of expertise. Nevertheless, such starting-
assumptions and institutional conclusions may be doubted and, indeed, are 
strongly questioned by influentially sophisticated sections within (national) 
regulatory debate who maintain a far more optimistic view of the continuing 
vitality of political steering mechanisms within the market. In this view, the 
trend to an autonomous market and independent regulation is wholly 
overstated: although the grand ideological battle between command 
interventionism and market autonomy appears to have been comprehensively 
lost, typological distinctions made between ‘responsive’, ‘smart’ or 
‘performance-based’ regulation do matter, or are argued to do so to the extent 
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that they both reflect and impact upon our view and our reality of how 
steering capacities within the modern economy are exercised and to what end 
(Vibert 2011). Autonomous regulation is not an act of deregulation, nor a 
mandated imposition of pareto-efficiency, but merely the establishment of a 
‘regulatory enterprise’ (Prosser 2010), within which the sharp divides made 
between public and private spheres, between efficiency-led regulation and 
continuing pursuit of social goals necessarily dissolve within a (traditional) 
praxis of discretionary supervision, a melange or network of (radicalised) 
delegation in which all competing regulatory rationales of efficiency and 
consumer choice, pursuit of legal rights, social solidarity and consumer 
protection are still to be fought out – or, more commonly, resolved (Prosser 
2010).  
On the basis of empirical evidence, the regulatory enterprise, is accordingly 
argued to represent ‘government in miniature’ (Prosser 2010), wherein 
seemingly minor typological regulatory distinctions may be argued to 
represent different models and rhetorical strategies detailing exactly how 
social and institutional resources might be utilised, regulatory actors be 
incentivised and, vitally, macro-economic goals be assured (Vibert 2011). 
Depending on the regulatory variant chosen, emphasis is accordingly laid 
upon knowledge and learning within a networked regulatory environment, 
wherein cognitive capacities of regulator and regulated are expanded and 
enhanced within a sliding enforcement scale, ranging from more common 
suasion to rarely-deployed sanction (Baldwin & Black 2010). Or, upon the 
behaviour or perceptions of private actors, whereby command is replaced 
with incentive and sanction with the (radical) steering-capacity of ‘nudge’ or 
the cognitive re-alignment of private to public interest (Thaler & Sunstein 
2008). To such functional efforts to improve the effectiveness and sensitivity 
of regulation, however, must be added a vital – in necessary response to crisis 
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(Black 2007; Baldwin & Black 2010) – ‘performance-based element’, which 
seeks to re-establish the missing-link, or component of macro-economic 
control; not, however, through defunct commands, but rather through better 
enunciation and co-ordination of micro and macro-economic goals (Vibert 
2011). 
In this view, the creation of the ESFS, or establishment of an institutionalised 
technocracy of European financial supervision, is accordingly not a particular 
problem of delegation of oversight capacities, but rather a long overdue 
recognition that political steering capacities over financial markets can now 
only be effectively exercised – also at supranational level – within 
autonomous regulatory structures that are sensitive to learning, incentives 
and public-private co-ordination. Above all, clear political elaboration of a 
series of regulatory goals that emphasise the macro-economic goal of 
‘financial stability’,24 overcomes the existing state of nature within European 
financial markets. Meanwhile, close co-ordination between macro and micro-
economic supervision is similarly assured both by institutional obligations 
placed upon ESAs to alert the ESRB to operational and product-based 
malfunctions that might endanger the ‘orderly functioning’ of financial 
markets. By the same token, the potential problems of ESA function may – in 
this view – be re-characterised as habitual characteristics of the regulatory 
space; commonly manifested features to be managed, rather than viewed with 
suspicion. Above all, sunset and revocation clauses, enabling re-entry of 
political power into the system might be argued to be a simple, if messy, 
manifestation of on-going political steering capacity; a vital means to adjust 
its on-going operation to regulatory goals. Equally, the apparent tension 
within the agencies between their market innovation functions – clearly 
enunciated within the pre-ambles of founding regulations - and their 
                                                        
24 Article 2, Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, of the European Council and Parliament, on macro-
financial oversight of the system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board. 
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precautionary role with regard to product regulation (Moloney 2011a), might 
suggest a lack of clarity within the regulatory mandate afforded agencies. 
However, it is also simple reflection of the necessary tensions that arise in any 
modern regulatory enterprise between notions of consumer choice, consumer 
protection and macro-steering: is the regulator a representative of (ethically or 
socially-constructed) consumer interests that defy commodification, a vital co-
ordinator between micro and macro-economic policy, or a facilitator for 
‘marketised’ consumer opportunity – a choice that is to be made in the 
instantiated light of deliberation. 
All is well in the world of European financial services regulation. Or is it? On 
brief reading, this regulatory debate presents a curious mix of blind optimism 
and equally unsighted rationalism, at least, with regard to steering that might 
accomplish (social) macro-economic goals. Diffuse feelings of social solidarity 
within ‘government in miniature’ are to be welcomed, but are surely no 
substitute for majoritarian self-dedication to comprehensive social 
redistribution; meanwhile assertion of social rights within executive process is 
necessarily piecemeal and subject always to the necessary balancing acts of 
juridification. Likewise, ‘nudge’, or the mechanism designed to ensure re-
alignment of private with public interest is itself inevitably founded within 
the market-leaning rationalities of behavioural economics, and would seem 
singularly ill-designed to implement wholesale challenge to the rationalities 
in which it is rooted. This final point is vital: within the optimistic regulatory 
debate itself, emerge conceptual problems of the ‘cognition failure’ to which 
‘risk-based regulation’ is particularly prone which – although underestimated 
within that debate itself – highlight a potential for rationality capture within 
modern regulation, which itself facilitates a fatal sociological abdication of 
political responsibility. 
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2. Rationality Capture  
Founded within the Basel III accords of the Basel Group of International 
Banking Supervisors that sought to overcome the deficiencies of the risk-
based regulatory scheme introduced by Basel II – a scheme which inexorably 
contributed to financial meltdown 25 - the underlying philosophy of the ESFS 
is founded in a process: (1) of debt de-leveraging through enhanced 
regulatory solvency; (2) of discouragement of systemically inappropriate debt 
re-securitisation by means of better co-ordinated oversight of economic 
solvency margins maintained by individual financial institutions, as well as 
their internal risk management processes; and (3) imposition of stringent 
market discipline and transparency to discourage further stealthy re-
securitisation. Reform specifically entails better oversight of the Value at Risk 
(VaR) methodology of prudential financial supervision26 introduced by Basel 
II: first, in order to minimise its internal ‘pro-cyclical’ impacts, whereby strong 
markets encourage hazardous debt-securitisation; and secondly, to improve 
external supervision with regard to VaR’s methodological application and the 
transmission of systemic shock.27  
At core, and beyond increased regulatory capital requirements, Basel III and 
the ESFS vitally do not represent a radical re-evaluation of the founding risk-
based regulatory philosophy of Basel II. Instead, they may be characterised as 
making corrective modification to the existing scheme of risk-based 
regulation and supervision and, in the case of the insurance sector, might also 
be argued to be a radical (and dangerous) extension of it.28 The continuing 
                                                        
25 The accords were ratified by the G20 in November 2010. 
26 Requiring financial institutions to assess their own liabilities with regard to calculations 
offsetting debt risks against credit potential within wider financial markets. 
27 With a particular focus on the insurance industry, Beltratti & Corveno (2008). 
28 To the degree that regulatory convergence in the financial services industry would seem to find 
its limits in its lack of recognition that the insurance product is ‘different’ – not a means of 
personal financial securitisation, but rather a product, which is bought to offset concrete 
contingencies (Beltratti & Corveno 2008). To this degree, it appears incongruous that VaR will be 
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dominance of the rationality of ‘risk-based’ regulation – or, more cogently, the 
failure to engage in explicit questioning of it – is nonetheless highly 
incongruous given the central role that it played in financial melt-down. A 
risk-based approach to regulation radically increases the risk of cognition 
failure – particularly with regard to a fragmented and decentralised regime of 
control - where supervisory or self-regulatory failure to identify and to 
communicate risks can and did cause systemic shocks of epic proportions.29 
More significantly, however, risk-based models of regulation may also create 
a lack of political accountability on the part of regulators: ‘[F]raming 
regulatory problems as risks allows regulators to argue that certain regulatory 
failures, are not regulatory failures at all, but normal events, which are to be 
expected, and for which they are not to blame’ (Black 2007:58). 
To radicalise and expand upon this statement with regard to a European 
regulatory space: where permissive consensus at national level has played its 
own role in the evolution of a European technocracy within the constitutional 
lacunae of the EU, a ‘normalisation of inevitability’ translates into regularised 
denial of political accountability. Here it may be argued that ideological battle 
has been replaced, not by a new political reality – reflecting ‘the old’ through 
‘government in miniature’ – but by a seductive formula of political abdication 
instead: the process of wealth-maximisation is a universal good – or normality 
– to which all conflicting political positions might commit themselves without 
fear of blame for its collapse. By the same token, the need for the ex ante 
political identification of what constitutes market failure is obviated. No break 
on autonomous market operation need ever be applied and political 
responsibility for the lost benefits of potential market innovation need never 
be assumed. Instead, the potential for collapse of wealth-maximising markets 
                                                                                                                                                              
applied to the insurance sector – by and large not impacted upon, or a player in financial crisis – 
for the first time.  
29 Recognised as a major cause of financial collapse, ‘The whole is only as strong as its weakest 
link’, see, IMF, The Fund’s Mandate – An Overview (January 2010), 12.  
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becomes the norm as it is re-characterised as a ‘risk’ that might be quantified 
and assessed within expert-led processes of evidence-gathering; to then be 
managed within a neutered ‘political’ process that also lends itself to the 
(expertly economic) techniques of cost-benefit analysis. Contrasting 
regulatory goals of consumer choice, consumer protection and macro-steering 
do not represent opposing political aims, but are, instead, neutral regulatory 
goods, the quantitative benefits of which might be objectively balanced the 
one against the other. 
Seen in this far more critical light, the vital problem is not one that regulators 
might deny blame for market failure, but rather that the concept of market 
failure has itself been expunged, that the famous distinction between 
uncertainty and risk made by Frank Knight (1921) has been collapsed, such 
that the question of political accountability for financial collapse need never 
arise. Rather than being founded upon a differentiation between risk and 
‘uncertainty’ – or, a situation of uncertainty to which politics would once 
respond by limiting the sphere of free operation of the market – modern 
economic policy is based upon the distinction between risk and a ‘normality’ 
(of market collapse), to which politics need not respond. In this setting, the 
specific constellation of expert oversight within a European space of 
governance matters, and gives rise to disturbing conclusions. First, at 
pragmatic level, the EU has not only already experienced ‘normal collapse’ 
within its risk-based schemes of governance. Instead, its ‘precautionary’ 
response has also proved inadequate with regard to re-entry of social 
concerns within EU policy (van Asselt & Vos 2008). The BSE crisis, in 
particular, still teaches us that risk-based models of regulation, and – above 
all, their evidence-based core – do not and can never furnish us with 
universally objective truths. Scientific method is scientific method: risk can 
only be modelled where evidence has been gathered that demonstrates its 
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existence. Permissively translated into regulatory models of wealth-
maximisation, the notion of ‘quantifiable risk’ accordingly becomes the 
spectre that promises to deceive; a social construction, which disguises the 
reality of hazard or uncertainty, for which no one holds themselves 
accountable. At the same time, however, the ideologically de-neutered 
response to scientific uncertainty – or principle of ‘precaution’, secured at EU 
treaty level (Article 191 TFEU) – has similarly confounded all mechanisms of 
judicial control: in a world dominated by the rationality of innovation and 
wealth-maximisation, courts will not re-instate political process, will not 
overturn expertise with reference to social or ethical concerns, will not 
substitute their will for that of political process. Instead, courts still demand – 
in defiance of all logic – an (impossible) evidentiary base for the existence of 
hazard, or for risk that has yet to be or cannot be quantified, with the 
consequence that  potential for harm remains unchecked (van Asselt & Vos 
2008).30 
Secondly, where a rationality of risk has established itself at the very core of 
the regulatory regime, it can surely only ever be challenged where political 
channels of influence are particularly strong. Nonetheless – as ECB actions 
during the sovereign debt crisis teach us – the autonomous institutions of 
European governance, discursively legitimated only by their expertise and 
their autonomy, are inevitably resistant, to all ‘contingent’ political influences 
that contradict their mandated regulatory objectives, and are so even to the 
point of systemic collapse. The strength of parliamentary oversight over ESAs 
might thus be particularly doubted, especially where it urges precautionary 
approaches to financial innovation: for telling example, all historical 
                                                        
30 The prime example is that of the slow but inevitable proliferation of genetically-modified 
organism throughout the EU. Ethical and social concerns about the impacts of GMOs have found it 
particularly difficult to assert themselves against the ‘governing rationality’ of the EU 
Commission and the refusal of the CJEU to afford and normative value to hazard (van Asselt & 
Vos 2008). 
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parliamentary efforts to enjoin pursuit of broader economic policy upon the 
ECB have been comprehensively rebuffed within a cognition dissonance of 
epic proportions (Atembrink & van Duin 2009). Where the justificatory 
discourse of independence within European governance has hardened into 
law, the ESAs may, as a simple result of their own self-justificatory 
legitimacy, find it hard to accept or even recognise interference with their 
evidence-based mandates, even where evidence has run out. 
The cognition gap identified as a major cause of financial collapse is radical in 
its extent and perhaps only accentuated by efforts to correct financial 
dysfunction within regimes of regulatory response, which disguise 
ideological abdication of responsibility for the political construction of market 
failure and instead create an appearance of objective truth and evidence-
based ‘certainty’ where none may exist. To this extent, problems of agency 
capture by economic interests are surely dwarfed by the self-capture of the 
system by a governing rationality of risk – a methodology of regulation that 
owes its existence, not to sovereign intent, but to political abdication. The 
hope that cognitive failure, even in relation to initially quite limited instances 
of financial innovation, can be overcome by ‘mavericks’ who question both 
the economic ‘science’ of VaR, as well as the construction of a ‘normality’ of 
market collapse, is a faint one.  
 
IV. The Technology of Expertise 
The problems of control of exercise of expert-based executive power are 
greatly magnified at an EU level where traditional forms of democratic 
process are in any case weak. They are necessarily accentuated where general 
trends to abdication of political accountability are naturally heightened within 
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the institutional and process lacunae of a governance structure, which must 
balance supranational integration intent against national interests. They are 
further radicalised where permissive consensus and a governing rationality of 
risk substitute for democratic will formation. The core issue, however, is not 
one of a lack of justification, or absence of attempts to legitimise the sphere of 
governance beyond traditional government. Instead, the governance 
enterprise is replete with justificatory discourse: of debate about a sphere of 
technocratic and market autonomy within which constitutional tradition 
(transmission) reacts against and is interwoven with expert-led and evidence-
based regulatory strategies; a realm of radicalised delegation where social and 
ethical concerns at least seek influence over, or re-entry within technical 
regulatory process. 
To contemporary regulatory debate, competing justificatory discourses and 
the contradictions inherent to the endeavour to establish an autonomous 
sphere of regulation, within which learning, but also continued engineering is 
the norm, do not recall historical spectres of the usurping administration. 
Instead, the blurring of the public and the private, the flattening of 
distinctions between governors and governed is no more than overdue 
pragmatic recognition that steering capacities cannot be assured through 
political fiat. Instead, steering is possible only where political capacity is 
radically extended into the private sphere, where it acts within a network of 
public-private relations. Pareto-efficient regulation is revealed as the purely 
theoretical construct even its supporters concede it to be (Majone, 
forthcoming); a putative limitation of the regulatory sphere which has no 
concrete meaning. Meanwhile, even Michel Foucault’s famous formulation of 
‘governmentality’ – the spread of a power of rationality across the web of 
human relations – finds its curious place within sections of contemporary 
regulatory theory, not simply as a characterising tool, which might be used to 
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describe the modern operations of steering capacity within autonomous 
market operation, but also as a potential ‘regulatory tool’ in its own right 
(Scott 2004). 
As much as it confounds, regulatory deployment of the work of Foucault is 
nonetheless illuminating to this analysis. Certainly, (slightly) more 
conventional analyses of modern power relations, which continue to posit the 
existence of sovereign will or a source of power, might provide regulatory 
debate with useful techniques to enforce steering-capacity within autonomous 
market logics: means of establishing an ‘unobservable’ power that impacts 
upon the minds of its subjects by usurping the environment of debate, ‘such 
that the subject can no recognise that other opportunities for action exist’ 
(Lukes 2005:14-29). However, the ‘power’ of governmentality and ‘political 
technology’ is a very different creature indeed, attaching to rationalities, or 
savoir faire, that are authored by and within human affairs, but of which man 
is no longer the subject but the object instead (Foucault 1994:416). The 
scientification of the social is radical in extent and entails negation, not of 
political steering capacity, but of political subjectivity itself. Rationalities are 
authored, but the political subject stands in a necessarily ‘agonistic’ 
relationship with them; simultaneously their ‘scientific object’, or a politically-
denuded entity forever struggling with and permanently provoked by 
political technology (Foucault 1994:343). Foucault is not a thinker who might 
aid to overcome the perennial danger of usurped executive power; instead, he 
is the thinker who demonstrates just how dark this spectre is. 
Seen in this light, the construction or ‘fiction' of pareto-efficiency and the 
modern transmission belt-model of administration take on a far more 
significant constitutional meaning. The core message that autonomous 
regulatory oversight and the fourth branch of government should only be 
established where regulation has no redistributive consequences (Majone 
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1994), may entail a radical extension of the self-limiting of the polity 
witnessed in the 18th Century creation of constitutionalised property rights. 
Nonetheless, the sphere of market rationality is itself subject to limits: above 
all, finance or monetary policy with all of its redistributive consequences can 
never be viewed as a suitable object for supervision (Majone 1996). Certainly, 
for example, independent central banks might still be established, but their 
creation must be understood as political projects with political consequences, 
for which political accountability must be assumed (Majone 2005). To this 
degree, the modern transmission-belt model reveals itself as the other side of 
the coin of renewed post-war or Hayekian commitments to the 
constitutionally-secured sphere of private autonomy: where Hayek 
emphasises the importance of establishment of spheres of autonomy outside of 
the political technology of the state and in defence against it, the modern 
transmission model, by contrast, raises a normative expectation that political 
technology will also be overcome within the state; markets may be made ‘free’, 
but, by the same token, political accountability must be explicitly assumed for 
political projects.   
The emergence of permissive compromise and a rationality of risk within the 
EU, and more particularly, their impacts within the ESFS, might accordingly 
be characterised, not as a radical extension of the traditional constitutionally-
secured sphere of (market) autonomy, but rather as a final perversion of it: 
following abdication of political accountability, the market becomes subject to 
the technology of expertise. Where permanent innovation within financial 
services markets – or substitution of ever more refined debt financing 
mechanisms for the (politically) defined, if lacklustre, product of traditional 
markets – forms a part of the permissive consensus which has also seen 
(Keynsian) debt privatised in ever more refined, but ever more illusionary, re-
securitisation mechanisms (Crouch 2011), we are all made complicit with a 
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rationality that entails the abdication of political accountability for public 
welfare. Where a rationality of risk normalises permanent potential for failure 
of financial markets, Foucault’s final and unexpected observations on the 
slow passage from Hayek’s self-limiting philosophies to the expansive 
rationalities of neo-liberalism – ‘anarcho-liberalism’ – prove topical, and 
highly uncomfortable. The rationality of wealth-maximisation, married with 
the behavioural sciences (economics), heightens permanent agonism between 
political subject and rationality, and does so to the point of systemic collapse: 
where expressions of political subjectivity, or attempts to adjust or influence 
autonomous expertise on the part of Parliament, Council or public may be 
characterised, to then be dismissed within the ‘science’ or rationality of 
regulation, as instances of ‘risk aversion’ within ‘economic objects’, political 
capacity and democratic will have been wholly usurped (Foucault 2008). 
The vision is without doubt dark, and hopefully overstated – at least as 
regards financial services. Nonetheless, darker visions, as well as clear 
instances of potential collapse within the technology of expertise of the 
European governance space are now painfully apparent. Where the only 
possible responses to the failings of a technocratic system of monetary 
supervision are a further technocratisation, the abdication of all political 
responsibility and accountability within Fiscal Union and establishment of 
‘technocratic governments’, then just as surely as European Union governance 
has innovated, it has only returned to Max Weber’s soulless administration or 
Carl Schmitt’s midnight black spectre of ‘technicity’ within the ‘Großraum’ 
(Joerges 2011). 
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